Mauricio Solaun U.S. Intervention and Regime Change in Nicaragua (2005)

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.The majority of prominent families had turned toopposition, including two of the three top financial groups (the third wasSomoza s).Also in opposition without governmental control were key organs of themedia, including the main newspaper and several popular radio stations.For-eign governments could also be counted.Cuba did not hold a pro-revolutionmonopoly.The Venezuelan and Panamanian governments were committed to defend Costa Rica against government of Nicaragua aggression, while CostaRica increasingly was becoming a base to export revolution to Nicaragua.Venezuela and Panama were assisting the Nicaraguan opposition and prod-ding the United States to kick Somoza out.At the same time the Sandinistas following was rapidly increasing, andtheir cadres were organizing fights and street actions although not all ofthese activists were ideologically Sandinistas, in the original sense of theterm of membership in the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (fsln).17Even sons and daughters of very prominent families were Sandinistas, and110 neutralitywith time their numbers increased.The point is that a fairly spontaneous,growing rebellion had taken hold, with participants in the disturbances withdifferent political self-identities, whom the population sympathetically calledlos muchachos (the kids) and considered to be Sandinistas.In the fao, then, there was broad ideological heterogeneity: the commondenominator was Somoza should have left yesterday. Was it a democraticmovement? Certainly not in any united sense.I found oppositionists who heldreservations about the desirability or viability of a representative democraticregime in the country.The total collapse of the U.S.policy at the end of theyear brought about the fao s replacement by a Sandinista-dominated, morestrongly authoritarian coalition.Yet the fao s heterogeneity contributed to its radicalization.In search of[110], (1leadership roles, many members vocally competed to show their anti-Somozastance to gain credentials.No one would talk to the dictator.The alternative leftseemed to be that either the United States would obtain Somoza s resignationLines: 2(and somehow help organize a new government), or there would be war.This only reinforced the general s most intransigent contempt for men who are6.5ptnot men enough to meet with me, and his conviction that the opposition was not a desirable, even viable, alternative to rule.NormalPgEnds:Somoza s Unshakeable Public CommitmentMy relationship with Somoza and his group had not been good.In fact, inmy first month in the country I had brought to the attention of Luis Pallais[110], (1Debayle, the president s first cousin and spokesman with whom I alwaysmaintained a frank and cordial relationship, that I had close links with theopposition only because Somocistas had deliberately kept distant from me.Luis s initiative to link me with the Somocista clique took the form of a largedinner party given for my family, where I discovered an incredible pattern.Onlythe wives of the functionaries present were available to be photographed withme except for members of Somoza s family.For example, I was engaged in aconversation with a cabinet minister and three women when a photographerfrom Novedades the government s newspaper, run by Pallais approached us.The minister literally ran away from our group so as not to be photographedwith me.The antecedent was that Cornelio Hueck, until recently president of theCongress, had been suddenly purged by Somoza soon after my arrival in thecountry.It was alleged that this was the result of inviting us to his house, mak-ing contact with me prior to my presentation of credentials while convalescentSomoza was still secluded in his hacienda.In fact, Don Cornelio had been thefirst of a handful of Somocista officials who during my tenure talked to me ofneutrality 111the need to replace Somoza.I should note, however, that Hueck was unableto create dissidence: he was totally socially ostracized by the Somocistas.Morethan one of them told me that Hueck was too ambitious and thus deservedhis ousting.From the very outset we had reasons to believe that no viableinitiative would materialize from the ruling group to persuade the president tocompromise: they were totally subordinated to the irreplaceable leader.Thiswas the old Somoza doctrine accepted by his team: chaos is the alternative tofamily rule.What if the general suddenly died?18Somoza was still a distant figure.Faced with the post-Chamorro crisis, thepresident changed tactics: he made an effort to become close to me and startedcalling me to see him on a one-to-one basis at least once a week.I think hebelieved he could win me over, that I would realize that he was the only leader[111], (20)with an organized following capable of ruling.In his view what he needed wasonly the backing of the U.S.government to stop the rebellion of all but thedie-hard Sandinista violentos.Lines: 261During this phase I perceived a man who combined a sharp natural intelli- gence with an unaffected frank disposition and projected warmth and simpat�a0.0pt Pgtoward me, though he retained the messianic self-image and tough defense of what he thought was his self-interest, extended to his group and nation.Normal PaThis is an immature opposition, Somoza was telling me: You see, I have notPgEnds: TEreimposed the state of siege, I have not repressed the opposition.They needtime to organize themselves.Why don t they come to negotiate a solution?Somoza s message in a sense was diabolic: These people are unreasonable.[111], (20)I am trying to be democratic. As the opposition did not meet his terms, hecould only come to one conclusion: I really tried.There is no alternative forme.This country is incapable of democracy, so I must be supported.Somoza tried to have me trust him, have me recognize that he was a man ofhis word. He repeatedly told me that now he was eager to negotiate with theopposition, that I should convince them to speak to him.His position seemedreasonable.How could the dynasty be dismantled in a relatively peaceful man-ner without negotiations with him? Somoza s uncle and family patriarch, LuisManuel Debayle, whom I personally liked and enjoyed, kept in close contactwith me.Very early he had given me a diagnosis: What is needed here is aslide he gesticulated an easy stepping down of the family from runningthe state, to live peacefully in a country not controlled by Marxist-Leninistdictators.In the face of the deadlock, I concentrated my efforts with Somoza.Unfortu-nately, when I explored the general s position, he refused to step down before1981.In fact, he had never denied that he intended to stop being president atthat time but still retain command of the National Guard.Although I had no112 neutralityinstructions to do so, I persuaded him to say publicly that he would relinquishpolitical power, leaving both the presidency and the National Guard at the endof his term [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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