Mark A. Bucknam Responsibility of Command, How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower over Bosnia (2005)

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.So, we didn t hit buildings that hadapparent administrative functions.So we limited by time of day, byfunction, by location, loss of life on the Bosnian Serb Army side.87As his chief of staff noted, Anytime there was doubt, we did-n t bomb.When we went after targets where there mightbe people around, we went at two o clock in the morning in aclear attempt on Mike s part to minimize loss of life. 88 GeneralRyan s efforts not only helped to keep the UN from breakingranks, they also apparently facilitated the peace negotiationslater at Dayton.At the Dayton peace talks, one member of theBosnian Serb negotiating team alleged large numbers of casual-ties and collateral damage in an apparent attempt to strengthenthe Serb bargaining position, but President Milosevic dis-missed the ruse, claiming that there were only 25 fatalities inthe whole air campaign. 89General Ryan had good political and practical reasons forlimiting BSA casualties.Political consent for the campaign,especially from the UN, dictated that NATO bombing go onlyso far in attacking the Serbs.90 Avoiding BSA casualties asmuch as possible kept NATO from crossing a fuzzy linebetween coercive diplomacy and war.The UN could not haveopenly endorsed a campaign against the BSA without a newSecurity Council resolution, and Russia would certainly havevetoed that.Without the UN s legitimizing acquiescence for thecampaign, NATO would probably have called for an end toDeliberate Force, leaving the US to decide whether to stop orcontinue with an ad hoc coalition.Moreover, had GeneralRyan purposely targeted BSA troops in their barracks or in the284DELIBERATE FORCEfield, he would have initiated a dynamic that would have beendifficult to control.As one senior NATO staff officer put it, Lordknows that once you kill somebody over there, it becomes afamily.vendetta, or religious thing, or whatever; and it shard to stop the cycle. 91 AFSOUTH commanders knew that ifDeliberate Force succeeded and a peace agreement followed,then NATO forces would be put on the ground in Bosnia toimplement the agreement and they would be responsible forcommanding that force.In all likelihood, the commanders didnot want to poison the post-Deliberate Force environment bygiving the Bosnian Serbs cause for revenge.Thus, political andpractical reasons militated against targeting BSA soldiers.The Bombing PauseNegotiations for a comprehensive settlement in the formerYugoslavia were ostensibly separate from the air strikes,which were conducted for the much narrower purpose of alle-viating the Bosnian Serb threat to safe areas.AlthoughGeneral Ryan and Richard Holbrooke maintained an arms-length relationship and denied any connection between thenegotiations and Deliberate Force, the two processes becamelinked on the second day of the campaign.92 At Milosevic sinstigation, through Paris and the UN and with Holbrooke ssupport through Washington General Janvier was invited tomeet with General Mladic to discuss a halt to the bombing.93Janvier asked for a 24-hour hold on air strikes, and AdmiralSmith consented.94 Late evening on 31 August, the CAOC staffwas notified to withhold all attacks after 4:00 A.M.the follow-ing morning about 50 hours after the campaign had started.On 1 September, Generals Janvier and Mladic met in theborder town of Zvornik,95 and Janvier sought to gain Mladic ssignature on a document pledging compliance with UN andNATO demands.96 The initial 24-hour pause was overcome byevents as the meeting between the two commanders stretchedtoward the 14-hour mark.At the end of the meeting, Mladicbrought Janvier a letter promising a Bosnian Serb cease-fireand a withdrawal from the Sarajevo exclusion zone so long asNATO and Bosnian government forces fulfilled certain Serbconditions.97 Janvier refused to sign Mladic s letter but left for285RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDZagreb confident the BSA commander would soon agree toWestern demands.98 Admiral Smith and a small entouragefrom Naples flew to Zagreb to meet Janvier at his compoundon the airport at Camp Pleso.99 Janvier convinced AdmiralSmith he had made significant progress toward getting Mladicto agree to halt BSA attacks on safe areas and to withdrawheavy weapons from around Sarajevo.100 Without seekingpolitical approval, Smith agreed to Janvier s proposal toextend the pause to 96 hours in order to give Mladic time tocomply [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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