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.Bold type as in original document.what they do most effectively, by concentrating on businessdevelopment, rather than being providers of services.Theonus should not be on us to resolve conflicts; it should be onthe elected representatives at each level of government.Is democratic governance encouraging better corporate governance?Both oil executives and some of their civil society critics believe democ-racy has opened spaces for dialogue and discussion ,45 even if thesespaces have not always been used to best advantage.Put at its mostoptimistic, if democracy thrives, there will be no more Ogoni conflicts.Liberalisation has created a more enabling environment in which it iseasier to work with federal and state governments :The Obasanjo government is open compared to the militaryregime, and also spreads the stakes of oil more widely in oil-producing areas.Larger revenues for state and local govern-ments have helped to keep agitation to the minimum.It alsomeans.aggression against [oil companies] may shift to stateand local governments.[ 79 ]OIL WARSDemocratic governance should in principle assure a more transpar-ent regulatory environment.But transparency and accountabilityhave until recently been resisted both by the operators and bygovernment agencies, each tending to blame the other.According toone executive:both at the centre and in the states the executive is too power-ful and the legislature, especially in the states, is a rubberstamp.Governors can easily influence legislatures by handingout contracts, or withholding funds from recalcitrant represen-tatives.All this affects law and order.Sometimes you ll findthe executive is behind people stirring up trouble, and a phonecall to Government House may be needed to call them off.One major difference from the military era is increased oversight by thefederal parliament, which has used it to influence the oil industry scommunity and environmental programmes.As a senator put it, because we have to scrutinise the NNPC budget, it is our responsibility to ensureit is properly used. Federal legislators also facilitate the resolution ofcommunity disputes to save the costs and problems of potential litiga-tions and violent disturbances.46 For example, when an occupationclosed a flow station in Nembe, three senators negotiated with commu-nity representatives and oil operators to agree on a new MOU, allowingits reopening.Nevertheless what legislators can achieve has beenseverely constrained, in part by the limited facilities of Senate and Houseof Representative committees, but also by the manifold contradictions ofNigerian politics.Legislators have scarcely been impartial in the manyfactional and political disputes dividing oil-producing states and localcommunities.Most were involved in the political infighting, electoraldisputes and efforts to unseat state governors, which created a heatedpolitical atmosphere during the 2003 elections.When the Publish What You Pay campaign (backed by the SorosFoundation) visited Nigeria in 2003 it argued that the major oil compa-nies have a responsibility to take an open stand on the use of oil fundsfor development, and to use their leverage to ensure a fair return forNiger Delta communities.But the companies have remained wary ofthe implications of greater transparency.When asked whether the Publish What You Pay proposals might be tried out in Nigeria, theresponse was far from enthusiastic: You forget we are a privatecompany was a typical comment in our own interviews.Since thenNigeria has signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-tive (EITI), though it remains to be seen in practice how much this willchange government and corporate behaviour.Meanwhile oil firms continue to downplay their room for manoeuvreand capacity to influence government:[ 80 ]NIGERIAThe idea that just because the country is 95 per cent dependenton oil, this gives the oil firms leverage and they should use itis very simplified.On the ground it isn t so easy.It is also avery political thing.Nevertheless companies can legiti-mately make their views heard, and say to government that itmust address the needs of the communities, to keep oilrevenues flowing.That of course is something the companies were either unable or unwill-ing to do under military governance.Moreover, reforms would not neces-sarily stem the tide of violence, which is also rooted in the tensions ofgovernance in a multicultural society and is by no means confined to oil-producing areas.As an oil executive complained, in Kaduna they see it assectarian violence, but in Warri they pin it on the oil companies. Even so,neither the oil firms nor the Nigerian state can escape responsibility for theprevailing insecurity in oil-producing areas.OIL AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN THE POST-MILITARY ERAWhere are the dividends of democracy?President Abacha s death in 1998 rescued Nigeria from a looming polit-ical crisis, which might have engulfed the Niger Delta and the countryin violence.It cleared the path for a rapid transition toward multi-partydemocracy.A new constitution was cobbled together under the interimmilitary administration of President (General) Abdulsalam Abubakarwith no public debate, paving the way for flawed, but hotly contested,elections and the installation in 1999 of an elected civilian governmentheaded by President (formerly General) Obasanjo [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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