Mahan Influence Of Sea Power Upon History

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.The former, being at the time wholly unimportant, received no attention from the allies until late in the war,when it fell after a six months' siege; whereas the latter, being considered of the first importance, absorbedfrom the beginning a very large part of the allied attack, and so made a valuable diversion in favor of GreatBritain.To this view of the principal features of the natural strategic situation in Europe may properly beadded the remark, that such aid as Holland might be inclined to send to the allied fleets had a very insecureline of communication, being forced to pass along the English base on the Channel.Such aid in fact was nevergiven.In North America the local bases of the war at its outbreak were New York, Narragansett Bay, and Boston.The two former were then held by the English, and were the most important stations on the continent, fromtheir position, susceptibility of defence, and resources.Boston had passed into the hands of the Americans,and was therefore at the service of the allies.From the direction actually given to the war, by diverting theactive English operations to the Southern States in 1779, Boston was thrown outside the principal theatre ofoperations, and became from its position militarily unimportant; but had the plan been adopted of isolatingCHAPTER XIV.CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME WAR OF 1778.232The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783New England by holding the line of the Hudson and Lake Champlain, and concentrating military effort to theeastward, it will he seen that these three ports would all have been of decisive importance to the issue.Southof New York, the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays undoubtedly offered tempting fields for maritimeenterprise; but the width of the entrances, the want of suitable and easily defended points for naval stationsnear the sea, the wide dispersal of the land forces entailed by an attempt to hold so many points, and thesickliness of the locality during a great part of the year, should have excepted them from a principal part in theplan of the first campaigns.It is not necessary to include them among the local bases of the war.To theextreme south the English were drawn by the ignis_fatuus of expected support among the people.They failedto consider that even if a majority there preferred quiet to freedom, that very quality would prevent them fromrising against the revolutionary government by which, on the English theory, they were oppressed; yet uponsuch a rising the whole success of this distant and in its end most unfortunate enterprise was staked.The localbase of this war apart was Charleston, which passed into the hands of the British in May, 1780, eighteenmonths after the first expedition had landed in Georgia.The principal local bases of the war in the West Indies are already known through the previous narrative.They were for the English, Barbadoes, Sta.Lucia, and to a less degree Antigua.A thousand miles to leewardwas the large island of Jamaica, with a dock-yard of great natural capabilities at Kingston.The allies held, inthe first order of importance, Fort Royal in Martinique, and Havana; in the second order, Guadeloupe and CapFrancais.A controlling feature of the strategic situation in that day, and one which will not be wholly withoutweight in our own, was the trade-wind, with its accompanying current.A passage to windward against theseobstacles was a long and serious undertaking even for single ships, much more for larger bodies.It followedthat fleets would go to the western islands only reluctantly, or when assured that the enemy had taken thesame direction, as Rodney went to Jamaica after the Battle of the Saints, knowing the French fleet to havegone to Cap Francais.This condition of the wind made the windward, or eastern, islands points on the naturallines of communication between Europe and America, as well as local bases of the naval war, and tied thefleets to them.Hence also it followed that between the two scenes of operations, between the continent andthe Lesser Antilles, was interposed a wide central region into which the larger operations of war could notsafely be carried except by a belligerent possessed of great naval superiority, or unless a decisive advantagehad been gained upon one flank.In 1762, when England held all the Windward Islands, with undisputedsuperiority at sea, she safely attacked and subdued Havana; but in the years 1779-1782 the French sea powerin America and the French tenure of the Windward Islands practically balanced her own, leaving theSpaniards at Havana free to prosecute their designs against Pensacola and the Bahamas, in the central regionmentioned.(1) 1.It maybe said here in passing, that the key to the English possessions in what was then called WestFlorida was at Pensacola and Mobile, which depended upon Jamaica for support; the conditions of thecountry, of navigation, and of the general continental war forbidding assistance from the Atlantic.The Englishforce, military and naval, at Jamaica was only adequate to the defence of the island and of trade, and could notafford sufficient relief to Florida.The capture of the latter and of the Bahamas was effected with littledifficulty by overwhelming Spanish forces, as many as fifteen ships-of-the- line and seven thousand troopshaving been employed against Pensacola.These events will receive no other mention.Their only bearingupon the general war was the diversion of this imposing force from joint operations with the French, Spainhere, as at Gibraltar, pursuing her own aims instead of concentrating upon the common enemy, a policy asshortsighted as it was selfish. Posts like Martinique and Sta.Lucia had therefore for the present war great strategic advantage over Jamaica,Havana, or others to leeward.They commanded the latter in virtue of their position, by which the passagewestward could be made so much more quickly than the return; while the decisive points of the continentalstruggle were practically little farther from the one than from the other.This advantage was shared equally bymost of those known as the Lesser Antilles; but the small island of Barbadoes, being well to windward of all,possessed peculiar advantages, not only for offensive action, but because it was defended by the difficultyCHAPTER XIV.CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME WAR OF 1778.233The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783with which a large fleet could approach it, even from so near a port as Fort Royal.It will be remembered thatthe expedition which finally sat down before St.Kitt's had been intended for Barbadoes, but could not reach itthrough the violence of the trade-wind.Thus Barbadoes, under the conditions of the time, was peculiarlyfitted to be the local base and depot of the English war, as well as a wayside port of refuge on the line ofcommunications to Jamaica, Florida, and even to North America; while Sta.Lucia, a hundred miles toleeward, was held in force as an advanced post for the fleet, watching closely the enemy at Fort Royal.In India the political conditions of the peninsula necessarily indicated the eastern, or Coromandel, coast as thescene of operations.Trincomalee, in the adjacent island of Ceylon, though unhealthy, offered an excellent anddefensible harbor, and thus acquired first-rate strategic importance, all the other anchorages on the coastbeing mere open roadsteads.From this circumstance the trade-winds, or monsoons, in this region also hadstrategic bearing.From the autumnal to the spring equinox the wind blows regularly from the northeast, attimes with much violence, throwing a heavy surf upon the beach and making landing difficult; but during thesummer months the prevailing wind is southwest, giving comparatively smooth seas and good weather [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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