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.As a result of Japan s occupation of the islands in WorldWar II, independence was not actually achieved until 1946.Seealso JONES ACT.346 " ULTRA-MAGIC DEAL U ULTRA-MAGIC DEAL.One of the most important and highly secretaspects of relations between the United States and Great Britainduring World War II was intelligence cooperation.General con-tacts began as early as 1937, and by the fall of France in June 1940,U.S.officials were prepared to exchange some intelligence on navalmatters.The U.S.Operation Magic broke Japan s Purple codemachine in September 1940, and the British had made progress inbreaking Germany s Enigma code machine, an operation known asUltra.In late 1940, a delegation from the U.S.Navy and U.S.Army mettheir counterparts in Britain, at the Government Code and CipherSchool at Bletchley Park.The Americans offered the Magic mate-rial, some other Japanese ciphers, the German diplomatic code, andItalian and Mexican codes.The British provided information on Axisand Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) encoding systemsand some codes from Latin America.The British could not readSoviet diplomatic material, but by 1941 they had penetrated Sovietmeteorological, naval, and army ciphers.Given the secrecy of suchcode-breaking activity, these contacts were developed hesitantly.Furthermore, while the British system was centralized, there wasmuch rivalry between the U.S.Navy and U.S.Army, with the Navysometimes refusing to provide Ultra material to the army that hadalready passed to the British.It was not until June 1943 that a formal agreement was made con-cerning the liaison, in the Britain United States of America Agree-ment (BRUSA).In this, they agreed to share finished intelligence,not the undecrypted raw product.Britain took prime responsibilityfor German communications, the United States for Japanese.Thefirst American party arrived at Bletchley Park in April 1943, anda proper team did not begin working there until January 1944.TheU.S.contingent amounted to 68 personnel: 12 or so were integratedinto the British operation, and the rest operated as liaisons at U.S.field commands.The level of cooperation in such a sensitive area isindicative of the special closeness of U.S. British relations duringthe war, and to a large degree it continued in the Cold War era andbeyond.See also SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.UNDERWOOD, OSCAR WILDER " 347UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER.During World War II, U.S.President Franklin D.Roosevelt announced in January 1943, at theend of the Casablanca Conference, that the policy of the Allies wasto require the Axis powers to surrender unconditionally.Prime Min-ister Winston Churchill of Great Britain may not have known thatRoosevelt was going to make the announcement but knew of the ideaof unconditional surrender.Churchill hoped that Italy could be drawnaway from the Axis by offering terms, while Roosevelt was moreconcerned to restate core Allied aims unequivocally.He was moti-vated by the domestic political storm that had arisen over the dealmade by General Dwight D.Eisenhower and Robert Murphy withAdmiral Jean François Darlan of the Vichy government duringOperation Torch.There was also a determination to avoid the situa-tion at the end of World War I, when Germany surrendered on thebasis of the Fourteen Points only to find itself faced with a postwarsettlement that departed from those principles.The resentment thatfollowed was now seen as a contributory cause of World War II.The policy behind Roosevelt s statement was implicit in the statedwar aim of achieving complete victory, and unconditional surren-der provided a basic policy that helped to avoid contention withinthe Grand Alliance.Some argue that implying there would be harshtreatment of the Axis encouraged last-ditch resistance by them.Cer-tainly the policy was used for propaganda purposes in Germany andJapan.German propaganda also cited the 1944 Morgenthau Plan,but the Atlantic Charter and United Nations Declaration werepublic statements that the Allies intended to construct a postwar orderbased on certain principles that would allow a place for the formerAxis nations.In the end, Germany surrendered unconditionally, butJapan gained one condition, the continuation of Emperor Hirohitoon the throne.UNDERWOOD, OSCAR WILDER (1862 1929).Oscar Under-wood represented Alabama in the U.S.House of Representatives in1895 96 but was replaced when the election result was contested.In 1896, he ran again and was reelected.He remained in the Houseuntil 1914 (becoming House majority leader in 1911), when he waselected to the Senate.Underwood was considered as a dark horsecandidate for the Democratic Party presidential nomination in 1912348 " UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICSand 1924.He introduced the Underwood Tariff Act (1913), whichdrastically reduced tariffs on imports, reflecting the Democratshostility to protectionism at this time.Underwood chaired the SenateCommittee on Cuban Relations and supported the foreign policy ofWoodrow Wilson
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Linki
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- 1505 1864, HistoriaPolski 1764 1864 3
- ebooks pl prawda o kielcach 1946 r jerzy robert nowak historia żydzi polityka polska rzeczpospolita państwo ojczyzna patriotyzm honor nkwd prowokacja
- 1505 1864, Historia Polski 1764 1864 4
- Martin Kat Serce 03 Mężne serce
- Martin Bobgan, Deidre Bobgan James Dobson's Gospel of Self Esteem & Psychology (1998)
- Wałek Czernecki Tadeusz Naród, narodowoœć, ojczyzna w starożytnoœci [Przeglšd Historyczny 1926 27 Tom 26 Z. 2]
- William G. Rothstein Public Health and the Risk Factor, A History of an Uneven Medical Revolution (2003)
- praca licencjacka 50 str wtym; historia internetu gry komputerowe mikrostruktury społeczne
- Kiley Deborah Scaling Albatros. Historia kobiety, która przetrwała na otwartym morzu
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