Michael Thomas American Policy toward Israel, The Power and Limits of Beliefs (2007)

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.2002).This combined Sharon s long-held goal of eliminatingArafat with Natan Sharansky s policy of democracy before negotiation. 51The announcement undercut Palestinians working for reform and Israelis,like Shimon Peres, advocating intensive diplomacy in tandem with the useof force (NYT 26 Jun.2002: A1).52 More violence, and more targeted Israeliassassinations resulting in civilian deaths, ensued.As conditions under occu-pation worsened, moderate Palestinians who could do so left the Territories(NYT 29 Jul.2002: A1).Bush s intended regime change in Iraq required Bush to placate Arableaders.He assured King Abdullah, Crown Prince Abdullah and others whowere concerned that Palestinian issues would be shelved, that he would beinvolved in moving the Middle East peace process forward (Remarks 4 Jun.2003).For several months prior to the invasion, the administration negoti-ated, not with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but with the EU, Russiaand the UN Secretary-General (the Quartet), producing A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli PalestinianConflict (Department of State 2003).53 The Road Map was announced on14 March 2003, seven days before Iraq was invaded; Condoleezza Riceemphasized that the Quartet expected it would be implemented, not rene-gotiated (Al-Jazeera interview 14 Mar.2003).Epilogue 189The Road Map s life was predictably short and unhappy.It describedthree phases : ending violence and building Palestinian institutions; creat-ing a Palestinian state with provisional borders and limited sovereignty;and final status issues.Obligations in each phase were to be reciprocal,performed in parallel. The Quartet undertook to facilitate each phase andto determine when obligations were met and the next phase could begin.Ineach phase, parties were asked to make concessions intended to build confi-dence, but that also ceded leverage in later, more critical phases of theprocess.The Palestinians were to strip Arafat of authority, not just overnegotiations but over much of the PA.The Israelis were to release territoryand loosen security controls concurrently with the new Palestinian primeminister s visible efforts (not successful efforts ) to reform the PA andcontrol terrorist groups.Even if both sides had fully accepted the documentin good faith and the Quartet had remained forcefully involved, the formulawas flawed.54 In the event, Israel heavily conditioned its nominal acceptance,Arafat probably never really accepted it and the Quartet s involvementdepended upon the United States, which was otherwise occupied.New Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas announced that the PAaccepted the Road Map without reservations (PC 4 Jun.2003).However, itwas soon clear that Arafat would not cede Abbas needed authority.Israel scabinet, after a stormy session, issued 14 conditions on acceptance of theplan.They included a complete absence of violence before Israel had anyobligations, insistence on the United States as sole monitoring authority andrejection of references to UNSCR 1397 or to Crown Prince Abdullah sMarch 2002 initiative as standards (Editors 2003).Many Israeli analysts sawSharon s conditioned acceptance as irrelevant, as his actions in the Territo-ries created the reality (Siegman 2003).Both sides carefully avoided stepsthat could not be reversed, creating a cycle of stutter-steps and retreats(NYT 17 Aug.2003: 43).Since the United States had imposed the Road Map on the parties, theysought negotiations with Bush rather than each other.Within weeks, bothAbbas and Sharon were in Washington requesting presidential recognitionof their efforts and pressure on the other side.Abbas said that Bush s visioncould not be realized if Israel continues to grab Palestinian land and tobuild the so-called separation wall on confiscated Palestinian land, amongother things (PC 25 Jul.2003).Sharon acknowledged that it had been relatively quiet, but attributed that to Israeli efforts, and demanded acomplete cessation of terror, violence and incitement and full dismantle-ment of terrorist organizations prior to any political process (PC 29 Jul.2003).Bush praised both men and told neither of them he had violated hisRoad Map undertakings.By September, it was clear that Arafat was block-ing Abbas; in October, he resigned, blaming lack of support by the UnitedStates and Israel [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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