Jonathan Renshon Why Leaders Choose War The Psychology of Prevention (2006)

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.Rather, it is when such thinking is combinedwith the belief that an adversary is hostile and war is inevitable, that thisfactor becomes increasingly significant.The window of opportunity factor was present in the case of India.However, it does not appear to have been an important factor in Indiandecision-making.This suggests that decision-makers might not see the samewindow that scholars, in retrospect, can identify.Theoretically, the condi-tions for such thinking existed in the early period covered in the case, in1982.Then, the Pakistani nuclear facility was about to go online, and wasvulnerable to attack.However, there did not seem to be any references to awindow of opportunity by Indian leaders in the press, though we cannotknow what was said in private.The reason that India did not strike theatomic plant was that a potential upswing in relations between the twocountries seemed to have overshadowed the idea of a window of opportu-nity.In fact, the window of opportunity for improved relations between theConclusion 157two states seems to have been more important than any opportunity thatIndia had to destroy Pakistan s nuclear capability.In the case of the United States and Iraq, there was no evidence of aclosing window of opportunity.Time was a factor, but the United States didnot have any military or strategic advantage that the passage of time woulderase.The best evidence that George W.Bush did not see a closing windowof opportunity is the circuitous route that he took to war.The pressures andconstraints imposed by a closing window of opportunity would probablyhave led Bush to push the country toward war much more quickly thanactually occurred.A SITUATION THAT IS PERCEIVED TO FAVORTHE OFFENSIVEThis factor was present in three of the cases examined in this book, two ofwhich did not end in preventive action.Of course, the presence of this factorcertainly does not preclude preventive action.However, the absence of thisfactor in the two cases where preventive action did occur suggests that itspresence is not a necessary condition for preventive war.In the case of the United States and the USSR, the belief that there was anadvantage in offensive action affected decision-making, but did not lead topreventive action.In fact, in this case, the main implication that decision-makers drew from the advantage of the offensive was the need for pre-emptive action.For instance, a JSSC report written in 1945 reported that thenature of the atomic bomb made conventional defense inherently inade-quate.17 Eisenhower made reference to the fact that an atomic threat was theonly threat that might, without notice, endanger the existence of the UnitedStates.He thus asserted his intention to launch SAC upon trustworthyevidence of an attack.18However, the belief that atomic weapons favored the offensive did notseem to have any impact on preventive war thinking.In all the statements byvarious leaders that advocated preventive war, none used the argument thatnuclear weapons favored the offense.The arguments in favor of preventivewar did refer to the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, but only to makethe point that the United States should not allow hostile states to acquirethem.In fact, there seems to be a noticeable aversion to admitting thatpreventive action requires going on the offensive.This makes some sense, aspreventive action can be defensive, and certainly explanations to an inter-national audience would focus on that aspect.But even in closed meetingsof the president and his top advisors, there seems to be an unwillingnessto admit that there is an aspect of offense involved in the proposition ofpreventive war.158 Why Leaders Choose WarThe belief that there was an advantage to the offense was also present, in amore limited way, in the India-Pakistan case.For the most part, it seems thatboth Indian and Pakistani leaders were focused on the immediate prospectof a conventional war, not a nuclear confrontation.However, there was, infact, a situation that favored the offensive.Both India and Pakistan werenuclear powers, but neither had a secure second-strike capability.In fact, it isnot even clear whether either country had weapons assembled during someof the time period covered in the case [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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